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Abstract
Data-centric technologies create information content that directly controls, modifies, or responds to the physical world. This information content resides in the digital world yet has profound economic and societal impact in the physical world. 3D printing and artificial intelligence
are examples of data-centric technologies. 3D printing utilizes digital data for eventual printing
of physical goods. Artificial intelligence learns from data sets to make predictions or automated
decisions for use in physical applications and systems. 3D printing and artificial intelligence technologies are based on digital foundations, blur the digital and physical divide, and dramatically
improve physical goods, objects, products, or systems. Data-centric technologies have crossed
national borders and rapidly attained adoption, even while patent law and copyright law have been
slow to respond. This Article focuses on 3D printing and artificial intelligence technologies and
their doctrinal disruptions through a conceptual matrix formulation. It describes how recent litigation over data-centric technologies has repercussions for creators and inventors in the protection of
data-centric innovations. Data-centric technologies’ doctrinal disruptions necessitate reevaluation
of copyright and patent doctrines, which were spawned in an era of human/physical considerations
to now including human/digital, non-human/physical, and non-human/digital considerations. The
future of patent law and copyright law will be dominated by non-human/digital considerations and
will impact innovation policy.
KEYWORDS: data-centric technologies, 3D printing, artificial intelligence, digitization, patent
law, copyright law, disruptions, doctrine, doctrinal disruptions, litigation, digital control
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INTRODUCTION

Research, development, and investment in data-centric technologies 1
has skyrocketed in recent years.2 Market adoption and customer use of datacentric technologies have followed a similar trend.3
Data-centric
technologies are proliferating at a faster pace than previous innovations.4
While data-centric applications have spread, intellectual property law
regimes have been slow to react. 5 Critical questions about intellectual
property protection have been understudied and the scope, standards, and
relationships between actors involved with data-centric technologies is

1.
Data-centric technologies is the term used throughout this Article to refer
to both 3D printing and artificial intelligence. See discussion infra Parts II–V. While datacentric technologies utilize and are controlled by software, data-centric technologies are more
closely linked to the physical world than software. Tabrez Y. Ebrahim, 3D Printing: Digital
Infringement & Digital Regulation, 14 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 37, 66 (2016)
[hereinafter Ebrahim, Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation]. This Article is focused on
the digital foundations that drive industrial applications in the physical world. See discussion
infra Parts II–V. Data-centric technologies are defined as technology capabilities that create
information content that directly controls, modifies, or responds to the physical world. Tabrez
Y. Ebrahim, Trademarks & Brands in 3D Printing, 17 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP.
L. 1, 7 (2016) [hereinafter Ebrahim, Trademarks & Brands]. Data-centric technologies’
information content resides in the digital world, yet its impact is in the physical world of
industrial applications. Id. at 7, 15.
2.
See Navin Shenoy, Innovating for the Data-Centric Era, INTEL:
NEWSROOM (Aug. 8, 2018), http://newsroom.intel.com/editorials/data-centric-innovationsummit/; Neil Tyler, The Future Is Datacentric, According to Intel, NEW ELECTRONICS (Mar.
13, 2018), http://www.newelectronics.co.uk/electronics-interviews/the-future-is-datacentricaccording-to-intel/170703/.
3.
Shenoy, supra note 2.
4.
See Tyler, supra note 2.
5.
See MICHAEL WEINBERG, IT WILL BE AWESOME IF THEY DON’T SCREW IT
UP: 3D PRINTING, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE FIGHT OVER THE NEXT GREAT
DISRUPTIVE
TECHNOLOGY
12
(2010),
http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/3DPrintingPaperPublicKnowledge.pdf.
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unclear. 6 A number of doctrinal disruptions have arisen with 3D printing
and artificial intelligence, particularly with patent law and copyright law.7
While trade secrecy has been an alternative intellectual property
protection mechanism proposed for the data-centric world, trade secrecy has
some downsides. 8 Trade secrecy of data-centric technologies reduces
incentives for creators and inventors, requires corporations to spend
resources on policies and reasonable steps to maintain trade secrecy, and
produces socially harmful results with innovations that do not enter the
public domain. 9 Unlike trade secret law, patent law and copyright law are
based on the notion that inventorship and authorship will be rewarded by
governmental incentives. 10 Therefore, data-centric technologies that could
attain copyright or patent protection incentivize an author or inventor to
recoup costs of research and development.11
There remain doctrinal quandaries concerning patentability and
copyrightability of two data-centric technologies: 3D printing and artificial
intelligence. 12 Data-centric technologies are defined to be information flows
more closely connected to the physical world than historical definitions of
software and computer code. 13 For example, 3D printing is considered a
data-centric technology because its use of Computer Aided Design (“CAD”)
files provide digital data for eventual printing of physical goods and
6.
See id.
7.
See Lucas S. Osborn, Trademark Boundaries and 3D Printing, 50 AKRON
L. REV. 865, 868–70 (2017); Andres Guadamuz, Artificial Intelligence and Copyright, WIPO
MAG., Oct. 2017, at 14, 17.
8.
David S. Levine & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Startups Use Trade Secrets?,
94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 751, 758–60 (2019) (suggesting that innovators of data-centric
technologies, such as software and business methods, tend to focus away from patents and
towards trade secrecy); Brenda M. Simon & Ted Sichelman, Data-Generating Patents, 111
NW. U. L. REV. 377, 379 (2017) (contending that inventions that generate data that is distinct
from the operation and use of the invention can be maintained as a trade secret).
9.
RONALD T. COLEMAN, JR. ET AL., TRADE SECRETS — THE BASIC
PRINCIPLES
AND
ISSUES
4
(2014)
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/litigation_committees/intellectual/t
rade-secrets-the-basic-principles-and-issues.authcheckdam.pdf; Simon & Sichelman, supra
note 8, at 432–33.
10.
Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 1, 11 (2007).
11.
See id.
12.
See Lucas Osborn, 3D Printing and Intellectual Property, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON DIGITAL TRANSFORMATIONS 254, 254 (F. Xavier Olleros & Majlinda Zhegu
eds., 2016); Sean Semmler & Zeeve Rose, Artificial Intelligence: Application Today and
Implications Tomorrow, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 85, 86 (2018).
13.
Marco Conti & Andrea Passarella, The Internet of People: A Human and
Data-Centric Paradigm for the Next Generation Internet, COMPUTER COMM., Oct. 2018, at 51,
51.

Published by NSUWorks, 2019

3

Nova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 3

290

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

objects. 14 Additionally, for example, artificial intelligence is considered a
data-centric technology because its information flows can be mathematically
trained from unique data sets for use in physical systems. 15 Unlike historical
definitions of software and computer code, such as source code and object
code, data-centric technologies directly connect with or control the physical
world through the laws of probability theory and information science. 16
This Article focuses on the patent law and copyright law doctrinal
disruptions of data-centric technologies. 17 Part II is descriptive and provides
the technological foundations and commonalties of data-centric technologies,
3D printing, and artificial intelligence. 18 It describes the similarities of
information representation of the physical world, blurring of the digital and
physical divide, ease of transmission, and ability to dramatically improve the
physical world through modifications in the digital realm. 19 Part III
describes the doctrinal foundations of inventorship in patent law and
authorship in copyright law as a few of a growing number of doctrinal
concerns, and introduces the ramifications posed by 3D printing and artificial
intelligence technologies. 20 Part IV.A describes litigation that has resulted
from the unclear doctrinal boundaries of copyright and patent protection of
data-centric technologies. 21 It identifies recent litigation and summarizes the
doctrinal issues underlying the disputes. 22 Part IV.B provides a conceptual
foundation and normative justifications for a new spectrum-based view on
legal standards. 23 It formulates a two-by-two matrix as a conceptual
framework of data-centric technologies encompassing axes of human to nonhuman and physical to digital. 24 It proposes that standards relevant to patent
14.
Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas S. Osborn, Digital Patent Infringement in
an Era of 3D Printing, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319, 1321 (2015); see also Osborn, supra note
12, at 257–58.
15.
See Semmler & Rose, supra note 12, at 86–87 (defining artificial
intelligence as “the process of simulating human intelligence through machine processes,”
specifying that machine learning, as a subset of artificial intelligence, learns from user-fed
data to respond to new data); Phillipe Aghion et al., Artificial Intelligence and Economic
Growth 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23928, 2017) (defining
artificial intelligence as “the capability of a machine to imitate intelligent human behavior or
an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range of environments.”).
16.
Stan Schneider, The Data-Centric Future, EMBEDDED SYSTEMS EUROPE,
Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 30, 30; see also Semmler & Rose, supra note 12, at 87.
17.
See discussion infra Part II.
18.
See discussion infra Part II.
19.
See discussion infra Part II.
20.
See discussion infra Part III.
21.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
22.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
23.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
24.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
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law and copyright law have not been static, but instead have been and
continue to be dynamic. 25 It suggests that the doctrinal origins of patent law
and copyright law were grounded in the human/physical conceptualization,
but data-centric technologies have now introduced human-digital, nonhuman/physical, and non-human/digital considerations. 26
The
conceptualization matrix will be reformulated with time progression to
become dominated with non-human/digital considerations and
inconsequential human/physical considerations. 27 This analysis suggests that
authorship and inventorship should not be evaluated within the human and
physical realms, but should also consider non-human and digital realms,
which would have prevented the recent litigation identified in Part IV.A. 28
The implication for innovation is that unclear doctrinal boundaries will
lessen incentives for copyright and patent protection in a data-centric world
and increase trade secrecy considerations.29 Part V concludes that datacentric technologies’ doctrinal disruptions necessitate reevaluation of
copyright and patent doctrines. 30
II.

FOUNDATIONS OF DATA-CENTRIC TECHNOLOGIES

The concept of data-centric technologies refers to technologies that
transmit, represent, modify, and/or control physical objects through digital
operation or use. 31 For instance, 3D printing technology can scan, modify,
and transmit a physical object for eventual production of the object at a 3D
printer located elsewhere. 32 Additionally, artificial intelligence technology
can generate statistical information about physical objects and interpret,
modify, and transmit that statistical information for control of physical
objects. 33 Specifically, these technologies operate mostly in the digital world
yet their beneficial use is in the physical world.34 While information content
25.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
26.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
27.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
28.
See W. Keith Robinson & Joshua T. Smith, Emerging Technologies
Challenging Current Legal Paradigms, 19 MINN. J.L., SCI. & TECH. 355, 357, 372 (2018);
discussion infra Part IV.A.
29.
Levine & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 758–60.
30.
See discussion infra Part V.
31.
See Tan Wee Kwang, The Future of Production: IoT, AI, Robotics,
Wearables and 3D Printing, ENTERPRISE INNOVATION: EGOV (Apr. 26, 2017),
http://www.enterpriseinnovation.net/article/future-production-iot-ai-robotics-wearables-and3d-printing-51643031.
32.
Stefan Bechtold, 3D Printing and the Intellectual Property System 3
(World Intellectual Prop. Org., Working Paper No. 28, 2015).
33.
See Semmler & Rose, supra note 12, at 86–87.
34.
See Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1321–22.
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technologies have generated data about physical objects, 35 data-centric
technologies are not limited to simply monitoring and estimating
performance of physical objects. 36 Instead, data-centric technologies offer
unique capabilities of controlling and transmitting a massive amount of
information about the physical objects. 37 When data-centric technologies are
utilized, information concerning physical objects and their control and
creation can be transmitted across national borders. 38
Some common traits of data-centric technologies are that they
depend on digital foundations, 39 blur the digital and physical divide, 40 and
dramatically improve physical goods in some way. 41 Both 3D printing and
artificial intelligence have underlying information content that is governed
by the law of mathematics and probability; yet, their resulting output is
applicable in the physical world of goods, objects, products, and systems. 42
Data-centric technologies’ information content produces information

35.
See K. J. Bathe et al., Some Recent Advances for Practical Finite Element
Analysis, 47 COMPUTERS & STRUCTURES 511, 511, 513–14 (1993) (illustrating finite element
procedures using iterative methods for analysis and structures with the use of computers);
Sergey P. Zotkin et al., About Development and Verification of Software for Finite Element
Analysis of Beam Systems, 111 PROCEDIA ENGINEERING 902, 902–03 (2015) (describing
structural analysis using the finite element method).
36.
See Betchold, supra note 32, at 3–5; Semmler & Rose, supra note 12, at
86–87.
37.
See Kwang, supra note 31.
38.
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a Private International Intellectual
Property Law: The Demise of Territoriality?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 713 (2009).
39.
See Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1321–22. Data-centric
technologies are digital in nature, but unlike pure software, which refers to data instructions
and executable code consisting of machine language instructions, data-centric technologies
refer to embodying and directly influencing the physical domain through software. Id.
40.
Id. at 1321. 3D printing’s use of CAD files blurs the divide between
digital representation of physical objects as blueprint instruction files. Id.; Lucas Osborn,
Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing: The Converging Worlds of Bits and Atoms, 51 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 553, 555 (2014) [hereinafter Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing];
Lucas Osborn, Of PhDs, Pirates, and the Public: Three-Dimensional Printing Technology
and the Arts, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 811, 812 (2014) [hereinafter Osborn, Of PhDs, Pirates,
and the Public]. Artificial intelligence blurs the divide between statistical methods that learn
from data sets to make predictions of future input data in a physical system or a manufacturing
process. See Semmler & Rose, supra note 12, at 86–87.
41.
See Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1321. 3D printing improves
development time through the use of prototyping to develop test products, which can quickly
be modified for production. Kwang, supra note 31. Artificial intelligence improves product
design, yield, and efficiency of physical goods and systems, such as manufacturing systems
and autonomous vehicle systems. See id.
42.
Ebrahim, Trademarks & Brands, supra note 1, at 7–9; Semmler & Rose,
supra note 12, at 86–87.
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goods. 43 The digital foundations of data-centric technologies have enabled
cross-border transmission or control of information goods without being
hindered by slow-to-respond copyright and patent laws. 44 However, unclear
scope of protection, legal standards, and legal relationships between actors of
copyright and patent protection of data-centric technologies have created
doctrinal disruptions that necessitate greater discussion. 45
A.

3D Printing

3D printing is a technology that enables creation, replication,
modification, and transmission of three-dimensional objects via instructions
from a digital file—a CAD file. 46 The process of 3D printing starts with the
creation of a digital representation in a CAD file of a physical object for
eventual 3D printing. 47 CAD files serve as templates and blueprint
instructions of the physical object that is 3D printed. 48 The creation of a
CAD file is either from scanning an existing three-dimensional object or
from creating a digital representation of a physical object in a computer
program. 49 The CAD file, which is the brain of the 3D printing operation, is
utilized to print the physical object by slicing the digital object into
electronic 2D layers that are sent to the 3D printer layer-by-layer to produce
the object layer-by-layer. 50 In effect, 3D printing technology enables users
to turn digital blueprints and digital models into physical objects with the
press of a button. 51 3D printing challenges intellectual property laws through
its digital approach to production and its customization. 52 The information
content of physical objects is embedded in CAD files, which can be

43.
See Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities,
56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 140–41 (2004) (describing that information goods, while unlike tangible
goods, still may entail the use of the bundle of rights analogy in balancing relevant competing
interests); Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing, supra note 40, at 572.
44.
See Dinwoodie, supra note 38, at 713; Lipton, supra note 43, at 164.
45.
See Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1325–27.
46.
Ebrahim, Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation, supra note 1, at 41;
see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality and Digital Patent Infringement, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES (T. Aplin,
ed. forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 2) (on file with author).
47.
Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1329.
48.
Ebrahim, Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation, supra note 1, at 41.
49.
Osborn, Of PhDs, Pirates, and the Public, supra note 40, at 814.
50.
Id. at 812, 814.
51.
Weinberg, supra note 5, at 2.
52.
See Michael Henry, How 3D Printing Challenges Existing Intellectual
PATENT
LAW
FIRM
(Aug.
13,
2018),
Property
Law,
HENRY
http://www.henrypatentfirm.com/blog/3d-printing-challenges-patent-law.
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modified, replicated, and shared digitally as information content and digital
data, away from control from centralized actors in a democratized fashion.53
B.

Artificial Intelligence

There is no single definition of artificial intelligence, 54 which is a
term that was first introduced in 1956 at an academic research conference. 55
The connotation of artificial intelligence has changed over time and with
rapid technological development. 56 The lack of a precise or commonly
53.
John Hornick, 3D Printing and IP Rights: The Elephant in the Room, 55
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 801, 804–05 (2015) (defining away from control to mean making
objects without anyone knowing or without being able to control it).
54.
KAY FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & YOON CHAE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
COLLIDES
WITH
PATENT
LAW
5
(2018),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_48540_WP_End_of_Innovation_Protecting_Patent_La
w.pdf (defining artificial intelligence as “a computerized system exhibiting behavior
commonly thought of as requiring intelligence” or “a system capable of rationally solving
complex problems or taking appropriate action to achieve its goals in real-world
circumstances”); Aghion et al., supra note 15, at 2 (defining artificial intelligence as “the
capability of a machine to imitate intelligent human behavior” or “an agent’s ability to achieve
goals in a wide range of environments”); Semmler & Rose, supra note 12, at 86 (defining
artificial intelligence as “the process of simulating human intelligence through machine
processes”); W. Nicholson Price II, Artificial Intelligence in Health Care: Applications and
Legal Issues, SCITECH. LAW., Fall 2017, at 10, 10 (defining artificial intelligence as relying on
“[s]uch algorithms . . . best described as black-box”); Chris Smith, Introduction, in THE
HISTORY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 4, 4 (2006) (defining artificial intelligence as “a system
which amplified people’s own knowledge and understanding”); Roger Parloff, Why Deep
Learning is Suddenly Changing Your Life, FORTUNE, (Sept. 28, 2016, 5:00 PM),
http://www.fortune.com/ai-artificial-intelligence-deep-machine-learning/ (defining modern
artificial intelligence as “a vast range of technologies—like traditional and rules-based
systems—that enable computers and robots to solve problems in ways that at least
superficially resemble thinking”).
55.
NILS J. NILSSON, THE QUEST FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A HISTORY OF
IDEAS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 77 (2009) (ebook). The term artificial intelligence came from a
proposal titled “Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence” that was submitted to the
Rockefeller Foundation in August 1955. Id. The proposal specified:

Id.

We propose that a [two] month, [ten] man study of artificial intelligence
be carried out during the summer of 1956 at Dartmouth College . . . . The study is
to proceed on the basis of the conjecture that every aspect of learning or any other
feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine can
be made to simulate it . . . . For the present purpose the artificial intelligence
problem is taken to be that of making a machine behave in ways that would be
called intelligent if a human were so behaving.

56.
Joost N. Kok et al., Artificial Intelligence:
Definitions, Trends,
Techniques, and Cases, in ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1, 1–2 (2009). The following definitions
of artificial intelligence are based on The New International Webster’s Comprehensive
Dictionary of the English Language, EncyclopedicEdition:
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accepted definition has made artificial intelligence seem like a black-box. 57
The breadth of each word, artificial and intelligence, conflates the
definitional problem of the nebulous and interdisciplinary phrase artificial
intelligence. 58 Artificial intelligence has been broadly defined as a program
running on a computer system that is able to learn and adapt itself in a
dynamic environment. 59 This Article utilizes machine learning, a sub-field
of artificial intelligence that applies algorithms to parse data and learns from
it to make a prediction about the physical world, when referring to artificial
intelligence. 60 Artificial intelligence technology, specifically machine
learning, 61 utilizes algorithms to change its output based on experiences, and
such learning can either be supervised learning or unsupervised learning. 62

Id. at 2.

An area of study in the field of computer science. Artificial intelligence
is concerned with the development of computers able to engage in human-like
thought processes such as learning, reasoning, and self-correction.
The concept that machines can be improved to assume some capabilities
normally thought to be like human intelligence such as learning, adapting, selfcorrection, etc.
The extension of human intelligence through the use of computers, as in
times past physical power was extended through the use of mechanical tools.
In a restricted sense, the study of techniques to use computers more
effectively by improved programming techniques.

57.
See Price II, supra note 54, at 10.
58.
Kok et al., supra note 56, at 1–2.
59.
Nicolas Miailhe & Cyrus Hodes, The Third Age of Artificial Intelligence,
17 FIELD ACTIONS SCI. REPS. (Special Issue) 6, 6 (2017).
60.
Id. at 7; Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87,
89 (2014); see also MARIETTE AWAD & RAHUL KHANNA, EFFICIENT LEARNING MACHINES:
THEORIES, CONCEPTS, AND APPLICATIONS FOR ENGINEERS AND SYSTEM DESIGNERS 1 (2015)
(describing machine learning as being able to predict future events or scenarios unknown to
computers; quoting Arthur Samuel as describing machine learning to be the “field of study
that gives computers the ability to learn without being explicitly programmed;” quoting Tom
Mitchell as describing machine learning in the context of “[a] computer program is said to
learn from experience E with respect to some class of tasks T and performance measure P, if
its performance at tasks in T, as measured by P, improves with experience E”).
61.
Surden, supra note 60, at 88–89 (defining machine learning techniques as
algorithms that have the ability to improve in performance over time on some task, by
detecting patterns in data in order to automate complex tasks and make predictions).
62.
INFO. COMM’RS OFFICE, BIG DATA, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, MACHINE
LEARNING AND DATA PROTECTION 7 (2017), http://www.ico.org.uk/media/fororganisations/documents/2013559/big-data-ai-ml-and-data-protection.pdf (defining machine
learning generally as being “the set of techniques and tools that allow computers to ‘think’ by
creating mathematical algorithms based on accumulated data” specifying that supervised
learning involves algorithms based on labelled datasets, such that the algorithms are trained
how to map form input to output with the provision of correct values assigned to them, and
where the initial training phase creates models of the world on which predictions can be made
in a subsequent prediction phrase; and specifying that unsupervised learning involves
algorithms that are not trained, but are left to find regularities in input data without what to
look for).
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Machine learning has gained prominence in a variety of applications since its
computational techniques and tools can automatically design models from
large amounts of observed data without relying on rule-based
programming.63 The ability to train existing data sets allows for the
production of data-generating patents, or inventions that result from
generating valuable data by design or use.64
C.
Digitization
Transmission

Commonalities:

Digital

Control

and

Digital

3D printing and artificial intelligence are different technologies yet
they share common traits of digitization and the sheer volume of data
creation. 65 These data-centric technologies have been enabled by increased
computing power that allow for easier data modification, storage, and
transmission. 66 For example, advancements in graphics processing units
have allowed for quicker and easier digital slicing of 3D printing CAD files
comprising complex objects. 67 As another example, advancements in
hardware resources and new computer architectures for high performance
computing allow for analysis of massive data sets based on specified
workflows. 68
63.
ALEX SMOLA & S. V. N. VISHWANATHAN, INTRODUCTION TO MACHINE
LEARNING 3–7 (2008) (describing a variety of machine learning applications, where there
exists a nontrivial dependence between some observations for which a simple set of
deterministic rules is not known, such as: (1) web page ranking, which is a process of
submitting a query to a search engine to find webpages relevant to the query and returning
them in an order of relevance; (2) collaborative filtering, where Internet bookstores utilize
users’ past purchase and viewing decisions information to predict future viewing and purchase
habits of similar users; (3) speech recognition, where an audio sequence is annotated with text
or where handwriting is annotated with a sequence of strokes; and (4) classification, where
spam filtering programs can identify whether an email contains relevant information or not,
such as a frequent traveler email, based on the type of user); see also GIANLUCA BONTEMPI,
HANDBOOK: STATISTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MACHINE LEARNING
9
(2017)
http://di.ulb.ac.be/map/gbonte/mod_stoch/syl.pdf.
64.
See Simon & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 378–79.
65.
See DAVID REINSEL ET AL., THE DIGITALIZATION OF THE WORLD: FROM
EDGE
TO
CORE
2–3
(2018),
http://www.seagate.com/files/www-content/ourstory/trends/files/idc-seagate-dataage-whitepaper.pdf.
66.
Zulfiqar A. Memon et al., CPU-GPU Processing, INT’L J. COMPUTER SCI.
& NETWORK SECURITY, Sept. 2017, at 188, 188.
67.
Xipeng Zhang et al., A GPU-based Parallel Slicer for 3D Printing, in
13TH IEEE INT’L CONF. AUTOMATION SCI. & ENGINEERING, 55–56 (2017); Tony Kontzer, How
GPUs Can Kick 3D Printing Industry into High Gear, NVIDIA: NVIDIA BLOG (June 6,
2017), http://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/2017/06/06/3d-printing/; NVIDIA GVDB Voxels,
NVIDIA, http://developer.nvidia.com/gvdb (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
68.
Mauro Garofalo, GPU Computing for Machine Learning Algorithms, 60
(2011) (unpublished thesis, Universita’ degli Studi di Napoli Federico ll),
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These data-centric technologies enable information-based product
development from digital transmission and digital control. 69 In both
technologies of 3D printing and artificial intelligence, control over the
physical good, object, product, or system is not entirely by an originatorhuman, who was the creator or inventor. 70 Instead, data-centric technologies
enable for non-human, digital control. 71 In the case of 3D printing,
democratization of manufacturing leads to making goods and parting away
from control by bypassing the traditional supply chain. 72 The ability to
easily modify, share, and transmit 3D printing CAD files has created new
interactions between creators, distributors, and end-users of physical objects
and products. 73 In the case of artificial intelligence—specifically machine
learning—computer programs make predictions and take action based on a
training set drawn from hypotheses. 74 In both cases, digital control is not
directed by the creator-inventor human, but instead by someone or something
else—another person or entity in 3D printing, and a learning algorithm in
artificial intelligence. 75 The issue of digital control of data-centric
technologies creates new patent law and copyright law doctrinal quandaries
concerning the scope of protection. 76

http://dame.dsf.unina.it/documents/TESI_GAROFALO_FINALE.pdf; Tulasi Bomatpulli et
al., High Performance Computing and Big Data Analytics — Paradigms and Challenges, 116
INTL. J. COMPUTER APPLICATIONS 28, 28 (Apr. 2015).
69.
See Memon et al., supra note 66, at 188; Ulf Koester, Product
Development: The Digital Thread in Industry 4.0, ORACLE (June 7, 2018),
http://blogs.oracle.com/today/product-development-the-digital-thread-in-industry-40.
70.
See REINSEL ET AL., supra note 65, at 2–3.
71.
See Azita Martin, The Difference Between Knowledge-Centric and DataCentric Approaches, MAANA (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.maana.io/2016/09/knowledgepower-not-data/.
72.
See Hornick, supra note 53, at 804–05 (suggesting that away from control
with 3D printing includes, “3D printing at home from blueprints obtained [from] peer-to-peer
[networks], . . . scanning and [3D] printing anything, . . . buying 3D printed products on the
black market,” obtaining other’s CAD files from the Internet; therefore, with selfmanufacturing, traditional supply chains will be disturbed, such that traditional manufacturers
will be forced to sell blueprint CAD files and retail outlets will face challenges in selling
products).
73.
See REINSEL ET AL., supra note 65, at 2–3; Kontzer, supra note 67.
74.
KE-LIN DU & M. N. S. SWAMY, NEURAL NETWORKS AND STATISTICAL
LEARNING 39, 39 (2014).
75.
See Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing, supra note 40, at
559; Semmler & Rose, supra note 12, at 86–87.
76.
See discussion infra Part III.
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The result of digital control not residing in the creator-inventor is
digital transmission.77 Data-centric technologies allow for the transmission
of information content concerning physical goods, objects, products, or
systems. 78 In the case of 3D printing, CAD files, which represent the
physical object that can be printed with de minimis effort, can be transmitted
from computer-to-computer or from one CAD file-sharing website to
another. 79 In the case of artificial intelligence—specifically predictive
analytics—which allows for the prediction of future outcomes and trends
based on large scale datasets, artificial intelligence can find and transmit
potentially valuable information about the physical world. 80 Artificial
intelligence “can increase the efficiency of industrial operations,” monitor
damage to equipment, and enable repairing actions. 81 The valuable
information from predictive analytics can take a variety of forms, which can
affect the value of a commercial good, object product, or system. 82 In both
cases, digital transmission disrupts traditional supply chains and traditional
relationships between commercial actors—between the manufacturer and
distributor in 3D printing and between the manufacturer and marketer in
artificial intelligence. 83 The issue of digital transmission of data-centric
technologies creates new patent law and copyright law doctrinal quandaries
which require evaluating statutes. 84

77.
See Kholid Rafsanjani, Data Transmission — Digital Data Transmission,
CCM (Feb. 6, 2018, 5:42 AM), http://www.ccm.net/contents/703-data-transmission-digitaldata-transmission.
78.
See Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1321–22, 1332.
79.
See id. at 1319, 1332.
80.
ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS: THE POWER TO PREDICT WHO WILL
CLICK, BUY, LIE, OR DIE 15–16 (2016).
81.
IAN WALDEN & THEODORA A. CHRISTOU, LEGAL AND REGULATORY
IMPLICATIONS OF DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES 5 (June 2018),
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/327013729_Legal_and_Regulatory_Implications_of_
Disruptive_Technologies_in_emerging_market_economics.
82.
See Thomas H. Davenport, A Predictive Analytics Primer, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.hbr.org/2014/09/a-predictive-analytics-primer (providing as
examples customer lifetime value, next best offer, most likely to buy next, forecasts, and
determination of best ads as examples of forms of predictive analytics).
83.
See id.; Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing, supra note 40, at
562; WALDEN & CHRISTOU, supra note 81, at 5.
84.
See Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing, supra note 40, at
586, 589.
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Information Property Commonalities

Data-centric technologies comprise information flows and
information ownership. 85 Intellectual property protection has existed for
“information products [such as] computer software and Internet business
[models].” 86 However, data-centric technologies, which share digital
characteristics of other information products, are different because their
information content has direct applicability in the physical world. 87 For
example, 3D printing CAD files are digital blueprint representations of
physical objects that can be produced with the simple click of a button.88 As
another example, artificial intelligence—specifically machine learning—
contains algorithms that provide valuable predictive information about the
physical world. 89
The mixing of digital and physical with data-centric technologies
challenges how we think about intellectual property protection. 90 Moreover,
such digital-physical mixed objects force reevaluation of whether intellectual
property protection even applies. 91 Data-centric technologies may contain
information property 92 that is not necessarily protected by a specific
intellectual property right or may thrive even without intellectual property
protection akin to the theory of the IP negative space. 93 Some aspects of
data-centric technologies fit comfortably well within traditional intellectual
property protection, such as printer equipment and ink with 3D printing and
computer readable media and methods with artificial intelligence.94
However, intellectual property law encounters quandaries with the digitalphysical mixed aspects, where the absence of or lack of clarity in information
property protection causes doctrinal disruptions. 95 This makes protecting
data-centric technologies more difficult for intellectual property owners. 96
85.
See Conti & Passarella, supra note 13, at 51–52.
86.
Lipton, supra note 43, at 143.
87.
See Ebrahim, Trademark & Brands, supra note 1, at 7.
88.
Id.
89.
INFO. COMM’RS OFFICE, supra note 62, at 9; Davenport, supra note 82.
90.
See Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 356.
91.
See id. at 356–57.
92.
See Lipton, supra note 43, at 140 (suggesting that information property
refers to private rights in information containing some degree of control over the relevant
information).
93.
Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 317, 319 (2011) (defining IP negative space as “a series of nooks, crannies, and . . .
oceans . . . where creation and innovation thrive in the absence of intellectual property
protection”).
94.
See Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 364–65.
95.
See id. at 357, 364.
96.
See id.
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DOCTRINAL QUANDARIES

Data-centric technology is a type of emerging, disruptive technology
for which the law has struggled to keep pace with its development and
adoption. 97 One reason is that data-centric technologies have challenged the
precise meanings of intellectual property doctrines, which did not envision
such technological advancements. 98 Another reason is that data-centric
technologies challenge the scope of intellectual property doctrines, which
may overlap or possibly have voids in coverage. 99 Additionally, data-centric
technologies create new interactions among actors that challenge the scope
of protection intended for each actor in a marketplace. 100 In sum, intellectual
property laws—particularly patent law and copyright law—are either illdefined or ill-suited for data-centric technologies, which have outpaced
intellectual property law’s response and adaptation. 101
There are numerous motivations for clarifying doctrinal patent law
and copyright law quandaries with data-centric technologies, or for any
emerging technology. 102
First, intellectual property law can enable
innovation and normatively steer technological development. 103 Second,
decisions about the scope of intellectual property coverage shapes society,
social futures, and sources of power. 104 Third, intellectual property law can
affect the diffusion of new technologies, the demand takeoff, and the creation
of complementary infrastructure. 105 These reasons motivate identification,
herein in Part III, of the doctrinal quandaries in each of patent law and
copyright law based on the foundations of 3D printing and artificial
intelligence identified in Part II. 106

97.
Id. at 356; WALDEN & CHRISTOU, supra note 81, at 3.
98.
See Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 356.
99.
Daniel Harris Brean, Patenting Physibles: A Fresh Perspective for
Claiming 3D-Printable Products, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 837, 841 (2015); see also
Rosenblatt, supra note 93, at 319.
100.
See WALDEN & CHRISTOU, supra note 81, at 4; Lucie Gaget, Artificial
Intelligence and 3D Printing: Meet the Future of Manufacturing, SCULPTEO: BLOG (Oct. 24,
2018),
http://www.sculpteo.com/blog/2018/10/24/artificial-intelligence-and-3D-printingmeet-the-future-of-manufacturing.
101.
Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 356.
102.
Id.; Rosenblatt, supra note 93, at 318.
103.
See WALDEN & CHRISTOU, supra note 81, at 3.
104.
Stephen Hilgartner, Intellectual Property and the Politics of Emerging
Technology: Inventors, Citizens, and Powers to Shape the Future, 84 CHI. KENT L. REV. 197,
198–99 (2009).
105.
See Shenoy, supra note 2; Tyler, supra note 2.
106.
See discussion infra Parts II, III.
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3D Printing

3D printing is an emerging technology that challenges how we think
about tangible and digital objects. 107 Intellectual property law scholars have
identified numerous doctrinal challenges with 3D printing CAD files under
patent law and copyright law, as well as trademark law. 108 The uncertainty
among the scope of protection afforded by intellectual property laws for 3D
printing CAD files has necessitated reevaluating the relationships between
actors in a traditional manufacturing value chain, since a producer can also
be a consumer. 109 Some scholars have developed proposals for reforming
intellectual property laws and proposed new regulations in response to the
emergence of 3D printing. 110
1.

Patent Law Disruptions

3D printing technology disrupts the patent system due to digitization
and decentralized production. 111 The heart of the doctrinal patent law
disruption created by 3D printing is “the CAD file, [which is] the digital
representation of a physical object [and] . . . a crucial component of the 3D
printing process.” 112 The digital-physical blur of 3D printing CAD files
presents challenges with patentable subject matter,113 digital patent
107.
Lucas S. Osborn, Doctrinal Quandaries with 3D Printing and Intellectual
Property, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. INTELL. PROP. LITIG., Summer 2016, at 18, 18.
108.
Osborn, supra note 7, at 868–69; see also Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 102, 112 Stat. 2860, 2861 (1998) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101–1401 (2012)).
109.
See Ebrahim, Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation, supra note 1, at
48.
110.
Brean, supra note 99, at 838, 842 (proposing the creation of new
Beauregard-like patent claim format to protect CAD files per se); Ebrahim, Digital
Infringement & Digital Regulation, supra note 1, at 67–70 (proposing the creation of a Digital
Millennium Copyright & Patent Act (“DMCPA”) and reformation of the repair-andreconstruction doctrine); Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 103, 112 Stat. at 2863.
111.
Geertrui Van Overwalle & Reinout Leys, 3D Printing and Patent Law: A
Disruptive Technology Disrupting Patent Law?, 48 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION
L. 504, 506 (2017).
112.
Id. at 512.
113.
Id. at 511–12 (suggesting that CAD files may face considerable patentable
subject matter challenges similar to traditional software application claims, and instead
proposing copyright as an alternative means of protection or suggesting focusing on the
physical aspect of CAD file if considering patent protection); Tabrez Y. Ebrahim, 3D
Bioprinting Patentable Subject Matter Boundaries, 41 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1, 44 (2017)
(suggesting that post-processing and integration of 3D bioprinted materials may challenge
patentable subject matter doctrine when they are indistinguishable from natural tissues and
organs); Phoebe H. Li, 3D Bioprinting Technologies: Patents, Innovation, and Access, 6 L.
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infringement, 114 and the International Trade Commission’s (“ITC”)
jurisdiction over importation of a patented article entering the United
States, 115 as well as civil procedure challenges. 116
First, 3D printing disrupts patentability because a CAD file, which is
essentially a mix of software instructions and program code that digitally
represents a three-dimensional object, may be too abstract to satisfy 35
U.S.C. § 101 or too challenging to claim in traditional patent claim format. 117
One patent law scholar has proposed using Beauregard patent claims for 3D
printing CAD files, but has also acknowledged limitations. 118 Additionally,
there has been debate on whether 3D printing of nature-based substances, in
3D bioprinting, would qualify as patentable subject matter. 119 This debate
has centered on whether 3D bioprinting technology has advanced to the point
of creating tissues and organs that are exact replicas of nature and on the
unsettled law of genetic replication. 120
Second, 3D printing disrupts patent infringement doctrine because it
challenges the reach of the infringement statute.121 A doctrinal assessment of
3D printing patent infringement focuses on what constitutes infringement
related to digital CAD files and whether laypeople qualify as indirect
infringers. 122

INNOVATION & TECH. 282, 288 (2014) (suggesting that certain cloning and human embryo
related inventions produced by 3D bioprinting may not be patentable because they violate the
morality exception in European patent law); Timo Minssen & Marc Mimler, Patenting
Bioprinting-Technologies in the US and Europe: The Fifth Element in the Third Dimension,
in 3D PRINTING, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION: INSIGHTS FROM LAW AND
TECHNOLOGY 13 (Rosa M. Ballardini et al. eds., 2017) (suggesting that perfect replication of
human organs via 3D bioprinting could blur the distinction between patentable and
unpatentable subject matter).
114.
Ebrahim, Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation, supra note 1, at 49;
see also Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1323–24.
115.
See Sapna Kumar, Regulating Digital Trade, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1909, 1917–
20 (2015).
116.
Ebrahim, Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation, supra note 1, at 49;
see also Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1332–33.
117.
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); Brean, supra note 99, at 852; Van Overwalle
& Leys, supra note 111, at 512.
118.
See Brean, supra note 99, at 842–845.
119.
See Ebrahim, supra note 113, at 3.
120.
Id. at 10; In re Roselin Inst., 750 F.3d 1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(holding that patent claims directed to the famed Dolly the Sheep were not patent eligible
since a cloned animal would be an exact genetic replica).
121.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012).
122.
See id.; Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1327.
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A statutory interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) concerning direct
infringement 123 and applied to 3D printing raises a number of questions, such
as: (i) is the CAD file itself considered an object, if someone uses a 3D
printer to print a patented object when the object is made without
authorization or without a license from the patent owner?; (ii) is the making
of a CAD file considered to be the making of a patented item under the
statute?; and (iii) is an offer to sell considered a true offer, since the sale of a
CAD file involves potentially selling many items—due to the CAD file’s
potential ability to make many items? 124
A statutory interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) concerning indirect
infringement could be interpreted to find anyone who posts a CAD file on a
file-sharing networking to be an indirect infringer. 125 Thus, 3D printing
intermediaries, 3D printing service companies, and anyone posting or
transferring CAD files on websites or peer-to-peer networks could be
accused of indirect patent infringement. 126
However, since direct
infringement is a necessary element of indirect infringement and it may be
difficult to ascertain the occurrence of the 3D printing infringing step, then
indirect patent infringement may not be clear cut. 127 Additionally, since
indirect infringement requires active inducement and it may be difficult to
find anyone who provided printing instructions, then indirect patent
infringement may be an even more challenging determination. 128
A statutory interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) concerning
contributory infringement 129 and applied to 3D printing also raises doctrinal
interpretation questions, such as: Is a CAD file considered a component of a
123.
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (specifying that “whoever without authority makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”).
124.
See Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1327–28, 1332–36.
125.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (stating “[w]hoever actively induces [the]
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer”); Ebrahim, Trademark & Brands,
supra note 1, at 50–51.
126.
See Ebrahim, Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation, supra note 1, at
51–52; Holbrook & Osbourne, supra note 14, at 1332, 1334.
127.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961); Ebrahim, Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation, supra
note 1, at 49.
128.
See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 760, 766
(2011); Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1335–36.
129.
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (specifying that patent owners may have a claim
against actors who while not directly infringing, aid and abet the direct infringer, by, for
example, supplying an individual component of a patented invention, more specifically,
requiring: (i) somebody offering to sell, selling, or importing into the U.S.; (ii) components of
a patented device; (iii) knowing the components are adapted for use in infringement of a
patent without substantial non-infringing use; and (iv) which result in an act of direct
infringement).
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patented device or does a digital representation of a physical object suffice to
be considered a component? 130 The uncertainty in the scope of contributory
patent infringement could be problematic for patent owners who may raise
claims in litigation against CAD file creators and CAD file distributors.131
The patent infringement disruptions of 3D printing also encounter
territoriality issues, since 3D printing CAD files can be transmitted across
borders. 132 The digital-physical blur of CAD files arises in doctrinal issues
of jurisdiction, such as whether the ITC’s breadth of statutory authority of
importation of articles encompasses the regulation of CAD files. 133 The
scope of whether the word articles includes electronic transmission of digital
data representing articles has not been considered by Congress and has only
recently been addressed by the Federal Circuit. 134
Each of these doctrinal disruptions stems from patent law lacking a
meaningful patent protection for the CAD file. 135 Quite simply, patent law
struggles with protecting digital representations of patentable physical
objects. 136 In doing so, the patent regime is challenged by 3D printing in
patentability and infringement.137
2.

Copyright Law Disruptions

3D printing technology disrupts copyright law since it challenges the
notions of copyright requirements and derivative works. 138 First, 3D printing
technologies face challenges with copyright protection due to the conceptual
separation between creative and functional features and the status of a
derivative work. 139
Second, 3D printing technologies are prone to
Napsteriz[ation], or similar peer-to-peer infringement issues faced by digital
music files. 140 The peer-to-peer reproduction and distribution issues raise

130.
See Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14, at 1345–48.
131.
See id. at 1353.
132.
See Daniel Harris Brean, Patent Enforcement in Cyberterritories, 40
CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at i–ii).
133.
See Kumar, supra note 115, at 1911–12.
134.
See id. at 1912–13.
135.
See Brean, supra note 99, at 840.
136.
See id.
137.
See id.
138.
See MICHAEL WEINBERG, WHAT’S THE DEAL WITH COPYRIGHT AND 3D
PRINTING?
4
(2013),
http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/What%27s%20the%20Deal%20with%20Copyright_%
20Final%20version2.pdf.
139.
See WEINBERG, supra note 5, at 5–6.
140.
Brean, supra note 99, at 857; see also Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 14,
at 1332–33.
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enforcement and civil procedure challenges in copyright law similar to that
of patent law. 141
Copyright protection over CAD files may be problematic in cases
where the 3D printed objects are not purely aesthetic. 142 The doctrine of
severability in copyright law prevents an object with both artistic and useful
features to attain copyright protection. 143 There is no straightforward
severability test and, therefore, a fact-finding inquiry into copyright
protection creates uncertainty as to the scope of copyright protection. 144
The possibility of copyright protection in 3D printing is further
complicated with the notion of derivative works. 145 This doctrinal issue is
based on the doctrinal assessment of CAD files in a digital environment,
which complicates whether copyright protects the design of the eventual 3D
printed object. 146 While unsettled, one viewpoint considers that a CAD file
that is protected by copyright would require permission from the copyright
holder to 3D print the object, since the physical object would be a derivative
work of the design in the CAD file. 147 This problem is further complicated
by whether the change in the 3D printed physical object is so minor and too
trivial to be entitled as a derivative work. 148
B.

Artificial Intelligence

Artificial intelligence technologies challenge the way we think about
patent law and copyright law doctrines. 149 Artificial intelligence applications
minimize the separation between human-generated content and machine141.
See Brean, supra note 99, at 857; Kumar, supra note 115, at 1912.
142.
WEINBERG, supra note 138, at 9.
143.
Id. (stating that if the aesthetic and functional features cannot be
separated, then copyright law errs on the side of keeping useful objects available to the entire
public and prevents attachment of copyright protection).
144.
ANGELA DALY, SOCIO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE 3D PRINTING REVOLUTION
26 (2016).
145.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining derivative work as “a work based upon
one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted”);
WEINBERG, supra note 138, at 19.
146.
WEINBERG, supra note 138, at 14.
147.
See id. at 19 (describing that copying and/or distributing the object into
3D-printed physical form would require permission from the copyright holder, but this
distinction can vary depending on whether the digital object in the CAD file was created by
scanning an object or was created digital in the CAD file itself); DALY, supra note 144, at 26.
148.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101; WEINBERG, supra note 138, at 19.
149.
Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 356–57; Guadamuz, supra note 7, at
17.
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generated content. 150 However, much of patent law and copyright law
focuses on either purely human control or human-machine interactions but
has yet to counter machine generated content. 151 As artificial intelligence
applications proliferate, patent law and copyright law will increasingly need
to respond to a world in which human, human-machine interactions, and
machine generations move closer together. 152
Some aspects of artificial intelligence technologies fit well within
traditional intellectual property law doctrines.153 For example, inventors
have obtained patents on equipment, processes, and chemicals controlled by
artificial intelligence technologies.154 Even some underlying business
methods of artificial intelligence technologies have successfully resulted in
issued U.S. patent claims. 155 As another example, musicians could
conceivably obtain copyright protection on artistic and musical works with
the help of artificial intelligence technologies. 156
However, intellectual property laws encounter difficulties when
algorithms can learn and make predictions on data. 157 These techniques are
different from the use of computational statistics, mathematical optimization,
or finite element analysis as computational research tools, which have been
utilized to solve equations concerning the physical world for many years. 158
Recent advances in computing power, algorithms, and sensor technology,
and the proliferation of data as a strategic asset, have enabled computers to
make data-driven decisions that affect the physical world.159 For example,
machine learning is being utilized for autonomous vehicles, 160 medical
imaging interpretation and diagnosis, 161 oil and gas exploration, 162 and
150.
See Guadamuz, supra note 7, at 17; JJ Charlesworth, AI Can Produce
Pictures, but Can It Create Art for Itself?, CNN: STYLE (Sept. 10, 2018),
http://www.cnn.com/style/article/artificial-intelligence-ai-art/index.html.
151.
See Bechtold, supra note 32, at 19; WEINBERG, supra note 138, at 2.
152.
See Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 364–65; Neil Ballinger, The
Proliferation of Artificial Intelligence in 2019 Could Lead to a New Talent Gap, DRUM: NEWS
(Jan. 29, 2019, 4:35PM), http://www.thedrum.com/news/2019/01/29/the-proliferationartificial-intelligence-2019-could-lead-new-talent-gap.
153.
See Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 364–65.
154.
See id. at 365; FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 5, 8.
155.
See Levine & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 754, 758.
156.
Guadamuz, supra note 7, at 17.
157.
FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 6, 8.
158.
See id. at 5; DU & SWAMY, supra note 74, at 39.
159.
See FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 5–6; REINSEL ET AL.,
supra note 65, at 2.
160.
LEX FRIDMAN ET AL., MIT AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY STUDY:
LARGE-SCALE DEEP LEARNING BASED ANALYSIS OF DRIVER BEHAVIOR AND INTERACTION WITH
AUTOMATION 3, http://www.arxiv.org/abs/1711.06976.
161.
Maryellen L. Giger, Machine Learning in Medical Imaging, 15 J. AM. C.
RADIOLOGY 512, 512 (2018).
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predictive maintenance of manufacturing systems. 163 The ability to
determine anomalies and predict solutions in behavior profiles of physical
phenomena makes protection of machine-controlled physical phenomena
difficult for intellectual property owners. 164
1.

Patent Law Disruptions

Artificial intelligence technologies infuse the role of a machine in
the invention process. 165 The algorithms at the heart of artificial intelligence
are arguably playing a role in conception and reduction to practice of
inventions. 166 Some algorithms substitute the human in the inventive
process, and other algorithms augment the human in the inventive process. 167
While conceptually, such algorithms do not think in the cognitive sense of
humans, the line between what is attributable to a human and what is
attributable to a human-machine interaction becomes blurred. 168
The involvement of artificial intelligence technologies in the
invention process raises doctrinal patent law issues concerning
inventorship, 169 non-obviousness, 170 and enablement. 171 These doctrines
162.
Hossein Hassani & Emmanuel Sirimal Silva, Big Data: A Big
Opportunity for the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industry, 42 OPEC ENERGY REV. 74, 74, 78
(2018).
163.
Gian Antonio Susto et al., Machine Learning for Predictive Maintenance:
A Multiple Classifier Approach, 11 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUS. INFORMATICS 812, 812–13
(2015); SUMEET KAUL ET AL., PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE AND THE SMART FACTORY:
PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE CONNECTS MACHINES TO RELIABILITY PROFESSIONALS THROUGH
THE POWER OF THE SMART FACTORY 3 (2017).
164.
See FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 6.
165.
See Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 357.
166.
MPEP § 2138.04 (9th ed. Rev 8, Jan. 2018) (quoting Townsend v. Smith,
36 F.2d 292, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1929) (defining conception as “the complete performance of the
mental part of the inventive act and it is the formation in the mind of the inventor of a definite
and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention as it is thereafter to be applied in
practice . . . .”); Id. § 2138.05 (stating that reduction practice, which “may be an actual
reduction or a constructive reduction to practice,” requires recognition and appreciation of the
invention); Mark A. Lemley, Ready for Patenting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1177 (2016)
(emphasis in original) (explaining that “conception of an invention does not require that the
inventor know that the invention will work for its intended purpose,” and that conception does
not require “reduction to practice [nor] experimentation”).
167.
Liza Vertinsky, Thinking Machines and Patent Law, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 489, 490 (2018).
168.
See id. at 490–93; Surden, supra note 60, at 89 (suggesting that the idea
that computers are learning is a metaphor and does not mean that machines are replicating the
cognitive abilities of humans in human learning).
169.
MPEP § 2137.01.
170.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
171.
Id. § 112(a).
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assume a human being as the inventor for inventorship, as a standard for
comparison of non-obviousness, and as providing some act of ingenuity to be
eligible patentable subject matter.172 The specific meanings of these
doctrines have profound implications for ownership and control of the
invention, as well as for management of innovation and competition. 173
First, artificial intelligence technologies seem to challenge patent
law’s inventorship doctrine, which is based on conception. 174 U.S. patent
law defines an inventor as being a human being, as evidenced in the
statement: “The threshold question in determining inventorship is who
conceived [of] the invention. Unless a person contributes to the conception
of the invention, he is not an inventor.” 175 Inventorship in U.S. patent law is
attributed to conception, which is defined as “the complete performance of
the mental part of the inventive act,” presumably achieved by a human
being. 176 The doctrinal issue is whether artificial intelligence technologies
qualify under the inventorship requirement of U.S. patent law. 177
Additionally, the creation and use of artificial intelligence technologies raises
the doctrinal issue of whether the human beings that assist artificial
intelligence technologies also qualify as inventors. 178 The doctrinal problem
with either the artificial intelligence technology or the human assisting the
artificial intelligence technology stems from patent law’s restrictive
definition of inventor and imprecise definition of conception. 179 Is the term
inventor in U.S. patent law limited to only a person, or does person have a
more expansive meaning? 180 Is conception in U.S. patent law restricted to a
mental act by a human being only? 181 U.S. patent law has not addressed
these questions. 182
Second, artificial intelligence technologies also challenge the nonobviousness doctrine, which is a threshold requirement for patentability in

172.
See FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 9–10.
173.
See Vertinsky, supra note 167, at 493; Iain M. Cockburn et al., The
Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Innovation 26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working
Paper No. W24449).
174.
See MPEP § 2138.04; Lemley, supra note 166, at 1172.
175.
MPEP § 2137.01 (quoting In re Hardee, 233 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122, 1123
(Comm'r Pat. & Trademarks 1984)).
176.
MPEP § 2138.04.
177.
FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 9–10.
178.
Id. at 10.
179.
See MPEP §§ 2137.01, 2138.04.
180.
See id.; Patrick G. Gattari, Determining Inventorship for US Patent
Applications, INTELL. PROP. & TECH L.J., May 2005, at 16, 16.
181.
See MPEP § 2138.04; Gattari, supra note 180, at 16.
182.
See MPEP § 2138.04.
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U.S. patent law. 183 The finding of obviousness is based on ascertaining the
difference between the claimed invention and the prior art based on the
“person of ordinary skill in the art,” or a PHOSITA, which is also known as
POSITA. 184 The POSITA is defined as “a hypothetical person who is
presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention,” 185 and
is also a “person of ordinary . . . creativity, not an automation.” 186 Thus, U.S.
patent law’s standard for obviousness involves a comparison with a
hypothetical person with knowledge of the relevant art or similar
technologies. 187 A doctrinal problem arises because inventions generated by
artificial intelligence technologies may not be comparable to the capabilities
of a POSITA. 188 Artificial intelligence technologies may develop inventions
based on learning from data representations—capabilities and computational
horsepower that is lacking in human beings. 189 In the rare case of an
extraordinary human being who possessed computational-like pattern
detection capabilities, they would be unable to develop the invention
generated by the artificial intelligence technology that learns from data
representations. 190 Another doctrinal problem arises from the phrase
relevant art, which may be problematic with inventions generated by
machine learning techniques that rely on training of unique data sets, since
machine learning algorithms are capable of changing their behavior to
enhance their performance; hence, the relevant art would conceptually
change. 191 Since relevant art is not static in a machine learning context, then
this aspect of the obviousness comparison standard is inapplicable for
comparison purposes. 192 Thus, the obviousness doctrine is problematic with
inventions generated by artificial intelligence technologies due to limitations
with the phrase person, unclear implications with the phrase not an
automation, and dynamic interpretation with the phrase relevant art. 193

10.

183.

35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 154, at

184.
MPEP § 2141.03.
185.
Id.
186.
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
187.
See id. at 419–20.
188.
See FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 5.
189.
See Lance Whitney, Are Computers Already Smarter Than Humans?,
TIME (Sept. 29, 2017), http://www.time.com/4960778/computers-smarter-than-humans/.
190.
Id.
191.
MPEP § 2141.03 (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 2018); see also Surden, supra note
60, at 89–90.
192.
MPEP § 2141.03; see also Surden, supra note 60, at 89–90.
193.
MPEP § 2141.03; see also Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d
1034, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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Third, inventions generated by artificial intelligence technologies
may not satisfy the enablement requirement of U.S. patent law. 194
Enablement requires that “one skilled in the art must be [able] to make and
use . . . that defined by the claim(s) of the particular application or patent.” 195
Similar to the issues with the obviousness standard requiring a POSITA, the
enablement requirement also faces challenges with the phrase “one skilled in
the art.” 196 In order for an invention created by a machine learning algorithm
to meet enablement, “one skilled in the art”—whether a person or machine
learning technique—would need access to the same data set utilized by the
machine learning algorithm that created the invention. 197 Since inventions
created by machine learning are based on detecting patterns in data and
making predictions based on training, one would not be able to make and use
the invention without data and without sophistication in knowing the same
machine learning technique. 198 The enablement standard is problematic with
artificial intelligence technologies due to the inapplicability of the phrase
“one skilled in the art.” 199
Each of these doctrinal disruptions stems from patent law lacking
meaningful patentability standards and terms applicable to artificial
intelligence technologies. 200 Quite simply, patent law struggles with its
focus on a human being in its patentability requirements. 201
2.

Copyright Law

The conceptual difficulties with copyright law for artificial
intelligence technologies concern the doctrines of authorship, 202
originality, 203 and work made for hire. 204 Copyright law protects original

(2012).

194.

FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 4; see also 35 U.S.C. § 112

195.
MPEP § 2164.
196.
Id. §§ 2141, 2164.01; Frank A. DeCosta & Aliza George Carrano,
Intellectual Property Protection for Artificial Intelligence, WESTLAW J. INTELL. PROP., Aug.
30, 2017, at 3.
197.
MPEP § 2141; DeCosta & Carrano, supra note 196, at 3.
198.
DeCosta & Carrano, supra note 196, at 3.
199.
Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
200.
FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 4.
201.
Id. at 8–9.
202.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (stating that “[c]opyright protection subsists, in
accordance with this title, in original works of authorship . . . .”).
203.
H.R. REP NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (which
codifies developments in case law that require some independent creation by the author and
modest quantum of creativity); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (which codifies developments in case law
that copyright protects an author’s expression of an idea, but not the idea itself).
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works created by authors, and the doctrinal issues concern whether copyright
protection can be attained for computer generated works. 205 Similar to
artificial intelligence technologies that develop functional patentable
inventions embodying utility, artificial intelligence technologies can develop
potentially copyrightable works embodying creativity. 206 Thus, similar to—
although distinct from—ingenuity and inventorship issues with artificial
intelligence patents, creativity and authorship issues arise with copyrightable
works from artificial intelligence technologies.207
First, copyright law is a form of protection for anyone who creates
original work[s] of authorship. 208 The problem with works generated by
artificial intelligence technologies—or computer-generated works—is that
they do not fit “the standard model of copyright law, [for] which a person” is
the author who creates the work. 209 Artificial intelligence can output what
appears to be a work created by its underlying technology, “but there [is] no
person whose actions resemble those of a traditional author.” 210 In such a
case, the meaning given by copyright law’s existing construction of
authorship does not qualify works generated by artificial intelligence
technologies. 211 The lack of a spark of human brilliance and the lack of
human creativity showing some creative spark would suggest that copyright
law would not qualify computer generated works for authorship. 212 In fact,
the U.S. Copyright Office has indicated that a work must be created by a
human being to qualify as a work of authorship. 213 The unresolved question

204.
17 U.S.C. § 101; Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in
Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1190 (1986).
205.
Samuelson, supra note 204, at 1185 (defining computer generated work as
“software [that] automatically generates output that is not identical to its own text, some of
which is potentially copyrightable and some of which is not.”).
206.
See id. at 1197; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b), FIFTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE,
supra note 54, at 4.
207.
See FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 4; Samuelson, supra
note 204, at 1192, 1195–97.
208.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
209.
Bruce E. Boyden, Emergent Works, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 377, 378
(2016).
210.
Id.
211.
See FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 8.
212.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991);
Margot E. Kaminski, Authorship, Disrupted: AI Authors in Copyright and First Amendment
Law, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 589, 592 (2017); see also Annemarie Bridy, The Evolution of
Authorship: Work Made by Code, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 395, 398 (2016) (providing as
reasoning, that how creativity defined as quintessentially human faculty would prohibit
computers, or artificial intelligence technology utilized by computers, from being authors).
213.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE
PRACTICES 313.2 (3d ed. 2014) (stating that “the Office will not register works produced by a
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on this doctrinal issue is whether the artificial intelligence technology is an
assisting mechanism to a human being, or whether the authorship was not
truly fully executed by a human being. 214
Second, depending on how the invention is developed by the
artificial intelligence technology, it may or may not contain the requisite
originality. 215 In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 216
the Supreme Court ruled that the Copyright Clause requires originality,
which means that “(1) the work must be independently created (2) with a
modicum of creativity.” 217 However, copyright law has not defined the
precise boundaries and scope of creativity. 218 While the lack of clarity
concerning creativity has not caused much litigation concerning creativity
since Feist, copyright law is facing a doctrinal disruption with creations from
artificial intelligence technologies. 219 The notions of independent creation
and modicum of creativity are being strained by human-machine interactions
or machine-generated works of artificial intelligence technologies. 220
Third, the work made for hire doctrine of copyright law could either
help to complicate or to resolve doctrinal copyright disruptions of artificial
intelligence technologies. 221 The work made for hire doctrine, which is
found in “Section 201(b) of the Copyright Act, states: ‘In the case of a
work-made-for-hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was
prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title.’” 222 Thus, a
person who is an employer and one who has played no role in the creation of
the work could be treated as the author and owner of the work. 223 The
doctrinal problem stems from “a broad, utilitarian interpretation of [the]
author[],” and hence, for the work made for hire doctrine. 224 A person who
is a motivating factor in producing can be considered to qualify as the author
for the work made for hire, and in doing so, would treat the employer as the

machine or mere mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any
creative input or intervention from a human author.”).
214.
Samuelson, supra note 204, at 1192.
215.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2012); Edward Lee, Digital Originality, 14
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 919, 920 (2012).
216.
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
217.
Lee, supra note 215, at 920.
218.
Id. at 920–21.
219.
Id.; see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 345.
220.
Lee, supra note 215, at 920–21.
221.
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012); Bridy, supra note 212, at 400–01.
222.
Robert C. Denicola, Ex Machina: Copyright Protection for ComputerGenerated Works, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 251, 275 (2016) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 201(b)).
223.
Id. at 276.
224.
Id. at 277; see also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
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author. 225 The treatment of a work generated by artificial intelligence
technology as a work made for hire would provide a solution to the
aforementioned doctrinal copyright problems of vesting legal rights in a
machine for a computer-generated work. 226 However, the level of human
interaction with an artificial intelligence technology would weigh on the
assessment of the work made for hire doctrine. 227 For example, a small
degree of human interaction with an artificial intelligence technology could
prevent attributing authorship to the employer. 228 Thus, similar to the
unresolved question of authorship with artificial intelligence technology, the
applicability of the work made for hire doctrine depends on whether the
authorship was not truly fully executed by a human being. 229
IV.

INITIAL DATA-CENTRIC LITIGATION & A CONCEPTUAL PROPOSAL

The law’s struggle “to keep pace with technological developments”
has always raised questions about intellectual property protections in
emerging areas. 230 Data-centric technologies are not an exception. 231 Some
of the aforementioned doctrinal quandaries have created unclear boundaries
concerning patent law and copyright law protections, which has resulted in
initial litigation. 232
A.

Doctrinal Problems in Recent Litigation

There is a mismatch between traditional intellectual property law
doctrinal frameworks and new innovation with data-centric technologies,
which has resulted in recent litigation. 233 These cases have centered over
tensions in the scope of protection. 234

225.
Denicola, supra note 222, at 277 (quoting Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne,
Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).
226.
Bridy, supra note 212, at 400.
227.
See id. at 399–400.
228.
See id.
229.
See id. at 400.
230.
Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 356.
231.
See id. at 356–57.
232.
See supra Section III.B.
233.
See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283,
1286–88 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 2018); Purepredictive,
Inc. v. H20.AI, Inc., No. 17-cv-03049-WHO, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139056, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 29, 2017).
234.
See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC, 810 F.3d at 1286–87; Naruto, 888 F.3d
at 420; Purepredictive, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139056, at *7–21.
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3D Printing Patent Law Dispute Over Articles

In ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. International Trade
Commission, 235 the dispute centered on the interpretation of the term articles,
which the ITC has the power to regulate under section 337 of the Tariff
Act. 236 The doctrinal issue concerned whether the production of digital data
sets of infringing digital patient data files was considered to be unfair
importation into the United States. 237 In evaluating whether a patent owner
could assert whether another entity was importing infringing articles, the ITC
interpreted articles broadly to include all intangible digital information and
asserted jurisdiction over digital information, resulting in an appeal to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 238 After a challenge of the
ITC’s decision, the Federal Circuit challenged the ITC’s decision that its
jurisdiction included digital files and held that Congress had never intended
the ITC to have authority over the Internet. 239 While the Federal Circuit
determined that Congress had directly spoken on this issue concerning
articles, it also brought to light the imprecise and vague meaning of
articles—which Congress may still want to clarify further. 240 This case
highlighted the mismatch between a definition intended by Congress and the
patent law’s inability to keep with digitization and digital transmission of 3D

235.
810 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
236.
Id. at 1286–87; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).
237.
ClearCorrect Operating, LLC, 810 F.3d at 1286–88; Barclay Oudersluys,
Following ClearCorrect: A Guideline for Regulating Digital Trade, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
653, 659–60 (2017).
238.
ClearCorrect Operating, LLC, 810 F.3d at 1286; Oudersluys, supra note
237, at 659–60; see also Kumar, supra note 115, at 1912, 1924–25 (summarizing that the
litigation involved plastic, invisible braces for repositioning teeth and a series of custom-made
aligners for successively straightening a patient’s teeth, wherein the sequence of events
included: (1) uploading digital scans of patients’ teeth to a server in Houston; (2) digital
modification by creating digital models of patients’ teeth in Pakistan; and (3) retransmission
back to Houston for downloading and eventual 3D printing of physical models of the patient’s
teeth to create aligners; noting that none of the patent claims were directed to a tangible
object, but instead were directed to methods of creating dental appliances, digital data sets,
and digital treatment plans; stating that the ITC interpreted the term articles broadly to include
all intangible digital information).
239.
ClearCorrect Operating, LLC, 810 F.3d at 1294, 1302; see also
Oudersluys, supra note 237, at 661–62.
240.
ClearCorrect Operating, LLC, 810 F.3d at 1291–92, 94; Oudersluys,
supra note 237, at 661–62.
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printing. 241 It provided motivation for how the law should evolve in light of
a proliferating data-centric technology. 242
2.

Artificial Intelligence Patent Law Dispute Over Predictive Analytics

In Purepredictive, Inc. v. H2O.AI, Inc., 243 the dispute centered on
patent eligibility of predictive analytics and whether the mere running of data
through a machine goes to the “general abstract concept of predictive
analytics rather than a specific application.” 244 The case, which is being
appealed to the Federal Circuit, centers around whether an artificial
intelligence technology—specifically machine learning ensembling in the
form of predictive analytics that “could be performed by humans”—qualifies
as patentable subject matter or is an abstract idea. 245 This case highlights the
mismatch between patent law’s origination on human-based considerations
in the physical world and emerging artificial intelligence technologies that
focus on non-human considerations in a digital world. 246
3.

Artificial Intelligence Copyright Law Dispute Over Monkey Selfie

In Naruto v. Slater, 247 the dispute centered on whether animals could
sue for copyright infringement and on who had rights to a photograph taken
by a macaque. 248 The case concerned the doctrinal issue of whether animals
had the statutory standing to sue for copyright infringement under the
Copyright Act. 249 While the case did not concern data-centric technology,
but instead a monkey, the underlying issue of the lack of specificity of
241.
See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC, 810 F.3d at 1291–92, 1295; Kumar,
supra note 115, at 1912, 1924–25; Oudersluys, supra note 237, at 661.
242.
See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC, 810 F.3d at 1291–92; Oudersluys,
supra note 237, at 658, 664.
243.
No. 17-cv-03049-WHO, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139056, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 29, 2017).
244.
Id. at *15.
245.
Id. at *4, 6, 13–15.
246.
See id. at *7.
247.
888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018). This monkey selfie litigation is being
classified under artificial intelligence for the purposes of this Part IV and for the purposes of
this Article, even though it does not fit the prior definition of artificial intelligence technology.
Paulina Julia Perkal, Monkey Business Finally Settled: The Monkey Selfie Disputes, KLUWER
COPYRIGHT BLOG (Feb. 5, 2018), http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2018/02/05/monkeybusiness-finally-settled-monkey-selfie-disputes/; see also Naruto, 888 F.3d at 431. The
reason for introducing this monkey selfie case here is to provide an analogy of a non-human
consideration, which has similar consideration as artificial intelligence technology with
respect to copyright law. Perkal, supra; Naruto, 888 F.3d at 420.
248.
Naruto, 888 F.3d at 420.
249.
Id.
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copyright law for animals—and arguably other non-humans, such as
artificial intelligence technology—is similar. 250 This case highlights the
mismatch between copyright law’s coverage to certain entities, touching on
the similar consideration of authorship with artificial intelligence
technology. 251
B.

Conceptual Data-Centric Matrix to Address Doctrinal Disruptions

Data-centric doctrinal disruptions of an initial litigation is a result of
intellectual property law’s traditional assumptions that do not keep pace with
emerging technologies. 252 While there may not be “a single model legal
framework to govern” emerging technologies, intellectual property law
should still evolve and clarify its scope of protection in order to avoid
litigation. 253
This Part introduces a broad, over-arching conceptual
framework for intellectual property law’s treatment of scope of protection in
present day, in the past, and in the likely future. 254
1.

Introducing the Conceptual Data-Centric Doctrinal Matrix

The doctrinal disruptions brought by data-centric technologies and
the recent litigation concerning data-centric technologies can be
conceptualized as levels of interpreting domains of human, non-human,
physical, and digital. 255 This Part has conceptualized patent law and
copyright law statutes not as a static and narrow interpretation, but instead as
a dynamic and broad interpretation. 256 First, key patent law and copyright
law terms have varying meanings that are being brought to the forefront due
to unimagined, yet now feasible, data-centric technological developments. 257
Second, the scope of protection provided by patent law and copyright law
will continue to change as data-centric technology continues to advance at a
much faster pace than regulations. 258
These considerations are
250.
Id. at 425–26.
251.
Id. at 420.
252.
See Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 356.
253.
WALDEN & CHRISTOU, supra note 81, at 3.
254.
See infra Part IV.B.3.
255.
Naruto, 888 F.3d at 420; ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1286–87 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Purepredictive Inc. v. H2O.AI, Inc., No.
17-cv-03049-WHO, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139056, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2017).
256.
Kalin Hristov, Artificial Intelligence and the Copyright Dilemma, 57
IDEA: J. FRANKLIN PIERCE CTR. FOR INTELL. PROP. 431, 453 (2017); see also discussion supra
Part IV.B.1
257.
Hristov, supra note 256, at 437–38, 453.
258.
See Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 364–65.
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conceptualized in the forthcoming figures, starting with the present-day
pictorial representation of scope of coverage not as a dot or circle, but
instead as two-by-two matrix encompassing these multiple domains:

This conceptual data-centric doctrinal matrix demonstrates that
patent law and copyright law definitions, scope, and standards should be
evaluated in multiple domains, such as: (1) non-human in digital domain; (2)
human in digital domain; (3) non-human in physical domain; and (4) human
in physical domain. 259 This conceptual framework demonstrates that patent
law and copyright law is multi-faceted and more complex than what may
have been intended in their originations. 260
2.

From the Past to the Current Time

The aforementioned conceptual data-centric doctrinal matrix can
better be understood by evaluation from a time standpoint. 261 As shown
here, in the past, during the origination of patent law and copyright law
statutes, the definitions, scope, and standards were based on only physical
and human considerations—shown as region four, prior to the current time
and closer to time, below. 262

364–65.

259.
260.

See id. at 372.
See Kumar, supra note 115, at 1911; Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at

261.
See Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 364–65.
262.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 213, at 313.2 (stating that “To qualify as a work of authorship
a work must be created by a human . . . . [T]he Office will not register works produced by a
machine or mere mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any
creative input or intervention from a human author.”); Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at
364–65.
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Thus, the origination of patent law and copyright law in this
conceptual framework is based on the past—without digital and without nonhuman aspects. 263 However, present-day time has required patent law and
copyright law to evaluate data-centric technologies with considerations of
digital and non-human interpretations. 264 Thus, at the current time, the
definitions, scope, and standards of patent law and copyright law doctrines
are not limited to only human in physical domain, but instead, also
encompass non-human in digital domain, human in digital domain and nonhuman in physical domain. 265 The cause of recent litigation of data-centric
technologies is that data-centric technologies, in the current time, are being
evaluated by the origins of patent law and copyright law from a prior time
that based principles only on human and physical principles. 266
3.

From the Current Time to a Future Time

In order to prevent future litigation, patent law and copyright law
will need to evolve not only from their past framework to apply to a datacentric current framework, but also anticipate and prepare for a future
263.
256, at 440.
264.
356–57.
265.
266.

See FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 9; Hristov, supra note
Hristov, supra note 256, at 433; Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at
See Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 364–66.
See Perkal, supra note 247.
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framework. 267 Conceptually speaking, patent law and copyright law will
need to prepare for a future where data-centric technologies will need more
clarity and precision of non-human/digital considerations that will be
prevalent and dominating—shown in the future matrix closer to +time for
region 1, as shown below. 268 The future of data-centric technologies will
also need more clarity and precision of human/digital considerations—shown
in the future matrix closer to +time for region 2, as shown below—and nonhuman/physical considerations—shown in the future matrix closer to +time
for region 3, as shown below. 269
However, the human/physical
considerations will be less relevant in the future of data-centric
technologies—shown in the future matrix closer to +time for region 4, as
shown below. 270

Thus, this conceptualization has implications for how patent law and
copyright law should evolve in light of rapidly developing and proliferating

267.
FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 4; Hristov, supra note 256,
at 453; Robinson & Smith, supra note 28, at 372.
268.
See FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 4; Robinson & Smith,
supra note 28, at 372.
269.
See FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 14; Robinson & Smith,
supra note 28, at 372.
270.
See FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & CHAE, supra note 54, at 14; Robinson & Smith,
supra note 28, at 365–67.
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data-centric technologies. 271 First, patent law and copyright law should not
remain static, but should anticipate the need to evolve. 272 Second, patent law
and copyright law should focus on non-human and digital considerations. 273
Third, they should also anticipate an increase in unique, future doctrinal
disruptions not only in the non-human/digital domain, but also in the
human/digital domain and in the non-human/physical domain. 274 These
considerations will impact incentives for inventors and creative authors, and
in doing so, impact the breadth, pace, and scope of innovation and
advancement of data-centric technologies. 275
V.

CONCLUSION

Data-centric technologies such as 3D printing and artificial
intelligence are rapidly proliferating and gaining adoption. 276 Digitization of
the physical world into digital operation or use has enabled transmission or
control of information goods. 277 However, the information content view of
the physical world has caused doctrinal disruptions with patent law and
copyright law. 278 Imprecise and unclear definition, scope, and standards has
challenged doctrines and resulted in initial litigation.279 Data-centric
technology disputes will continue unless patent law and copyright law
embrace and better define the non-human and digital worlds, rather than
remaining tied to doctrinal concepts only in the human and physical
worlds. 280
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